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Abstract
Traditionally, the Latino electorate has been considered to be Democratic
in partisan aÆliation. However, during the 2000 presidential election there
were many eorts made by the Republican party to court Latino voters,
suggesting that perhaps Latino voters may be becoming more Republican in
orientation. Using a telephone survey of Latino likely voters conducted in
the 2000 election, we examine three dierent sets of correlates of Latino voter
partisanship: social and demographic, issue and ideological, and economic.
We nd that Latino voter partisanship is strongly structured by social and
demographic, as well as issue and ideological, factors. We also nd that
while it is unlikely that changes in economic factors or abortion attitudes will
signicantly change which parties the dierent Latino nation-origin groups
identify with, it is possible that changes in ideological positions regarding
the role of government in providing social services could result in signicant
changes in Latino party identication.
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Introduction:  Latino Voters and the 2000 Election 
 The 2000 presidential election saw unprecedented attempts by both major party 
candidates – and by both political parties – o appeal to the Latino electorate.  For possibly the 
first time in American history, both the Democratic and Republican nominees for president 
courted Latino voters, especially in California and Florida, with their own bilingual appeals.  
Both campaigns used Spanish-l guage advertisements, and both campaigns made special efforts 
to establish connections with Latino political and media elites.  This is not surprising on the part 
of the Democrats since the Latino community has historically voted strongly Democratic (García 
and de la Garza, 1977; de la Garza, et. al., 1992; DeSipio, 1996).  But, by making a direct effort 
to court the Latino vote, the Republicans in 2000 clearly believed they could make significant 
inroads into this segment of the electorate.  Many Republicans, especially in states in the 
Southwest, continue to argue that Latino socioeconomic mobility and social conservatism make 
them ripe for Republican “conversion.” 
 This belief on the part of Republican strategists raises a number of important research 
questions.  First, has Democratic partisanship in the Latino electorate eroded to the point where a 
sizeable number of Latino votes can be won by Republican appeals?  In other words, has 
Democratic partisanship declined significantly in the Latino electorate since the last round of 
important surveys of Latino partisanship in the late 1980s?  Second, are Latino voter political 
identifications more malleable and potentially influenced by short-t rm political and economic 
factors than those of other groups?  Much of the early work on partisan identifications in 
American political science has argued that partisanship is a long-term nd stable political 
affiliation, not one that can be easily altered by political campaigns or direct issue appeals 
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(Campbell, et. al., 1960; Miller and Shanks, 1996).  Is this true for the Latino electorate, or has 
their political experience been so different from the dominant Anglo experience to render moot 
any generalizations from earlier studies of Anglo political affiliations to the Latino electorate? 
In fact, we argue that Latinos constitute an important demographic group, and the study 
of their partisan and other political attitudes provide critical tests of existing political theory 
(García Bedolla, 1999; Hero, 1992).  The Latino population in the United States contains three 
basic groups: new immigrants who have not yet nationalized, new immigrants who have 
naturalized, and the native born descendents of immigrants.  Most of the research on political 
attitudes in the United States has focused on Anglo Americans, who look most like the third 
group – the native born.  But by focusing only on the descendents of naturalized, largely white, 
immigrants, we believe that previous research on the development of political attitudes may have 
been biased towards sociological explanations bec use Anglo respondents have tended to have 
longer socialization experiences in America.  But what about newly naturalized American 
citizens?  In some sense, these are individuals who enter American politics without necessarily 
having well-formed political ttitudes learned through social mechanisms.  Thus, it is possible 
that, initially, Latinos might learn their partisanship through more explicitly political means than 
Anglo-Americans.  So, through an examination of Latino political attitudes, we can learn not just 
about this one increasingly important component of the electorate but also perhaps learn more 
about the process through which Americans acquire their political beliefs. 
 These important research questions form the basis for the research we report in t is 
paper.  Using a telephone survey of Latino likely voters conducted in the 2000 election, we 
examine the correlates of Latino voter partisanship in this most recent presidential election.  In 
the next section of this paper we discuss the literature on par isanship and the underlying logic 
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for the model we test in this paper.  Then we outline the dataset we use, and discuss the basic 
methodology of our hypothesis testing.  Next we present our results, and conclude that indeed 
Latino voter partisanship is strongly influenced by both political and social factors.  Thus, the 
2000 Latino Voter Survey data provides a critical lens through which we can assess the current 
nature and status of Latino voter partisanship. 
 
Party Identification and Latinos 
 
 The main debate regarding the nature of partisanship in American politics has centered 
on how stable people’s partisan attachments are over the course of their lifetime.  The origins of 
this argument is rooted in the findings of The American Voter, where Campell, et. al. (1960) 
posited a political socialization model of partisanship: party identification constitutes an affective 
attachment to a social group, in this case, a party.  These attachments are learned early in life, 
often at a pre-political age, and remain fairly stable over time (Green and Palmquist, 1990; 
Miller, 1991; Abramson and Ostrom, 1991).  In this model, change can happen as a result of 
great personal changes, like marriage, children, or of exceptional political changes, such as the 
Civil War or the Great Depression.  Since these events do not happen often, they see political 
events as having little effect on the evolution of party identification in the individual.
 Revisionists have argued that party identification is not nearly as stable as the tradition l 
model has led us to believe and that respondents’ reported party identification fluctuates more 
often than has been assumed (Markus and Converse, 1979; Fiorina, 1981; Franklin and Jackson, 
1983; Franklin, 1984; McKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1989).  These scholars see party 
identification as a more dynamic process, driven by issues ranging from retrospective political 
and economic evaluations (Fiorina), past votes (Markus and Converse) and policy perspectives 
(Franklin and Jackson).  While tey may disagree on the agents driving change, their main 
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emphasis is that events in the larger political arena do affect the nature and strength of party 
identification, and that Americans can and sometimes do switch their party affiliation during 
their lifetimes. 
Despite the fact that partisan identification has been found to be a key aspect of American 
political behavior, we know little about the nature and stability of Latino party identification.  
Studies of partisanship in the U.S. have generally relied on national data sets like the ANES and 
Gallup Polls that contain few Latino respondents.  Most of the studies that have examined Latino 
political behavior have either had relatively small samples, or samples not representative of the 
national population f Latino voters, rendering any generalizations about the national Latino 
community problematic (Brischetto, 1987; Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner, 1991; Welch and 
Sigelman, 1993; Kosmin, 1995).  While studies using the Latino National Political Survey 
(LNPS), a nationally representative sample, have provided important insights into Latino 
political participation generally, few scholars have used this data to look explicitly at issues of 
party identification (de la Garza, et. al., 1992; García, F., Falcón and de l  Garza, 1996; DeSipio, 
1996; Uhlaner, Gray and García, J., 2000; Uhlaner and García, J., 2001).  Uhlaner and García 
(2000) find that policy positions affect Latino party identification more than ideology or 
demographic variables like education and income. Since the LNPS was conducted in 1989-90, 
the 2000 Latino Voter Survey provides an important basis from which we can assess the 
changes, if any, in Latino partisanship over the last decade and use this analysis as a bridge to the 
larger literature on partisanship generally.   
As we saw above, studies of party identification have generally found three kinds of 
factors affecting the nature and stability of party identification: social issues and a person’s 
socialization process; the nature of the political environment and resulting policy preferences; 
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and economic well-being.  To determine which is most salient for Latinos, we develop a fully-
specified model that looks at the effects of social, political and economic factors have on Latino 
partisanship.  In the next section we discuss how we operationalize and test our model for Latino 
voter partisanship. 
 
Survey Methodology and Research Design 
 To test our model, we use the 2000 Latino Voter Study conducted by the Knight-Ridder 
News Organization, which interviewed 2721 likely Latino voters from May 26, 2000 through 
June 15, 2000.1  Survey respondents were given the option of conducting the interview in 
English or Spanish, with the telephone interviewing being undertaken by International 
Communications Research (ICR) of Media, Pennsylvania.  The sample of likely Latino voters 
contains 611 respondents from California, 600 from Texas, 608 from Florida, and 600 from New 
York – the four states that have the largest populations of Latino voters.  Interviews were also 
conducted with 302 likely Latino votes from a handful of other states:  New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Connecticut.  Overall, these 
twelve states contain approximately 90 percent of the national population of registered Latino 
voters, insuring that the coverage of this survey did span the national population of the Latino 
electorate.  The national margin of error for this sample was 2%; the margin of error for the four 
main state samples of Latino voters was 4%.  The 2000 Latino Voter survey restricted 
interviewing to likely Latino voters, thus limiting our hypothesis testing to only Latinos who are 
registered and likely to vote.  This restricts our analysis, as we obviously cannot examine the 
partisan attitudes of non-registered and non-participatory Latinos with this dataset, an analysis 
                                         
1 A collection of the major stories written using this survey dataset can be found at 
http://www0.mercurycent r.com/local/center/lpoll0723.htm. 
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we will conduct with other datasets.  For our present purposes, we will examine only likely 
Latino voters, as they are the ones being actively courted by both political parties.  
 The survey questionnaire covered a wide variety of national and state political elections 
and issues.  All respondents were asked about their presidential vote preference and a series of 
questions about the issue positions and characteristics of he wo major party presidential 
candidates.  All respondents were also asked about their political beliefs, including partisanship 
and ideology, as well as a series of questions about their issue opinions and priorities.  Questions 
about ethnic identity and other aspects of the Latino political experience were posed to all 
national respondents, as were a series of demographic questions.  Last, there were short sub-
questionnaires that were used in three of the major state samples, California, New York, and 
Texas. 
 The dependent variable in our analysis is the respondent’s stated partisan affiliation.  The 
2000 Latino Voter Survey used a standard question to assess partisan affiliation:  “Generally 
speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent or something 
else?”  This survey did not ask respondents about the strength of their partisan affiliations2. 
From this questionnaire, we then used three sets of questions to test our main hypothesis 
about Latino partisanship in the 2000 lection:  social and demographic questions, political and 
issue questions, and economic status questions.  Our measurement of social factors is based on a 
series of binary variables taken from the 2000 Latino Voter Survey.  First we include indicators 
for ethnic origins: a binary indicator variable for whether the voter was foreign born or not, and 
                                         
2 Thus, our analysis examines only the direction of Latino voter partnership, and not the strength.  While earlier 
studies have looked at strength of Latino voter partnership (e.g. Uhlaner and Garcia 2001), we restrict our focus here 
to direction as most of the important hypotheses we wish to test are about direction of partnership and not strength.  
We also see direction as a more politically relevant issue regarding Latino voter partnership.  Last, by not studying 
strength we also sidestep the methodological debates over whether partisanship is a unidimensional or 
multidimensional type of attitude for Latino voters (for two perspectives on this methodological debate see Alvarez 
(1990) and Green (1988)). 
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three binary indicator variables for Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rican ancestry (Central American 
and other backgrounds were the excluded, comparison category).  We include a variable 
measuring maritial status, whether the voter is married or not.  Next, we include binary 
indicator variables for the lev l of educational attainment: completion of some high school, 
completion of high school, some college education, or a two-year college degree (four-yea  
college education is the excluded comparison category).  We include measures for the voter’s 
age, with binary indicators for the 18-30 age group, 31-45, and 45-60, with those older than 60 
the comparison category.  We also include binary measures for gender(whether the voter is 
female), catholics, and the voter’s primary language spoken at home (primarily Spanish or 
Spanish-English, with English-only as the comparison category). 
Next, to measure the impact of political issues, we begin by examining the impact of six 
different issues on Latino voter partisanship.  These issues are abortion, illegal immigration, 
affirmative action, school vouchers, government-sponsored health insurance and gun 
control.  To measure abortion’s impact on partisanship, we created a scale where liberal beliefs 
on abortion were coded high, no changes in abortion policy were coded moderate, and the 
imposition of restrictions on abortion were coded low, drawn from a question asking whether the 
voter thought abortion should be made easier to obtain, stay the same, or be made more difficult 
to obtain.  Illegal immigration, though, was measured based on a question that asked whether 
the voter whether they thought the U.S. government was doing too much, not enough, or the 
right amount – again, liberal beliefs were coded high, and conservative beliefs were coded low.  
Next, affirmative action beliefs were measured using a question that asked voters whether they 
though such programs should be continued, reduc  or expanded, and again we coded this so 
that the liberal response (in favor of expansion) was coded high.  School vouchers opinions were 
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measured using a binary measure, where opposition to vouchers was coded high and support was 
coded low.  Voter opinions about government-sponsored health insurance programs were also 
measured by a binary measure, where support for such programs was coded high and opposition 
to them was coded low.   
The last issue opinion measures were for the use of the budget deficit and gun control, 
and our measurement strategy here was somewhat different than for the previous issue opinions.  
The survey asked voters whether they favored a national concealed weapon ban, requiring 
handguns to have trigger locks, requiring licensing of handguns, and requiring handgun owners 
to attend a gun safety course.  A principle components analysis of these four responses showed 
they were highly intercorrelated; thus, we created a factor scale measuring general opinion about 
gun control.3  Regarding the budget deficit, he survey asked voters whether they favored using 
the budget surplus for a tax cut, to pay off the national debt more quickly, to stabilize Social 
Security, or to increase spending on domestic programs.  We include binary indicator vari bles 
for whether the voter prioritized, cutting taxes, debt reduction, or increased domestic spending, 
making the stabilization of Social Security the baseline comparison category.   
Two other political measures were included in our analyses of Latino voter p rtisanship.  
First, we examine binary indicator measures for liberalor conservative ideological affiliations – 
ideological moderation is the excluded category.  Second, the survey also asked voters whether 
they had participated in the previous presidential election, so we include a variable for new 
voters.   
                                         
3 The gun control questions began with the interviewer saying that “There are various proposals to regulate guns in 
this country.  Do you favor or oppose:   
 a nationwide ban on people carrying a concealed weapon? 
 requiring trigger locks to be sold with all new handguns? 
 requiring people to get a license in order to legally own a handgun? 
 requiring all handgun owners to attend a course on gun safety? 
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We have two economic measures in our model of Latino voter partisanship.  The first is a 
measure of retrospective economic perceptions: he urvey question asked voters to assess their 
own economic situation in the last four years.  The second measure in the economic model is the 
voter’s family income, which we include as a linear, seven category measure.   
Thus, our general model of Latino voter partisanship takes the following functional form: 
PID = F(Social and Demographic Factors, Political Opinions and Behavior and 
Economic Perceptions and Income). 
As our dependent measure for partisanship is a categorical variable, based on whether the voter 
identified as a Democrat, Republican or Independent, we used multinomial logit to estimate the 
effect of each independent measure on the relative probability that a voter would identify as an 
Independent or Democrat, or as a Republican or Democrat.4  The mul inomial logit estimates 
give us the ability to test the effects of each specific measure relative to other measures within 
the same basic explanatory model (for example, for the impact of affirmative action opinions 
relative to other political opinions) or across explanatory models (for example, looking t th  
impact of affirmative action opinions relative to social factors like age).   Unfortunately, the 
                                                                                                                              
The response options were randomly rotated to insure no response order problems.  The principal components 
analysis of these four items provided factor loadings of .425, .584, .553, and .541, respectively. 
4 For detailed discussion of the multinomial logit model see Aldrich and Nelson (1984) or Greene (2000, Chapter 
19).  The basic idea behind the multinomial logit model is that we observe a series of discrete, but unordered, 
outcomes.  We specify the probability that each individual in our sample picks from one of the set of outcomes as: 
 Pr(y=1) = (expXb(1)) / (expXb(1)  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
 Pr(y=2) = (expXb(2)) / (expXb(1)  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
 Pr(y=3) = (expXb(3)) / (expXb(1)  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
Where we have the outcomes coded 1, 2 and 3 (say, for example, as corresponding to Democratic, Republican, or 
Independent identification).  Unfortunately this model as specified bov  is not identified, so we need to 
“normalize” one of the parameter vectors (say for choice 1) to be equal to 1: 
 Pr(y=1) = (1) / (1  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
 Pr(y=2) = (expXb(2)) / (1  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
 Pr(y=3) = (expXb(3)) / (1  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
These probabilities are easily estimated by maximization of the following log-likelihood function: 
 ln L = åni=1 åJj=0 dij ln Pr(yi = j) 
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multinomial logit model produces results that can be difficult to understand, as they are non-
linear estimates (the impact of a particular variable depends on the values of the other variables 
in the model).  Thus we transform the multinomial logit parameters into relativ  risk ratios; the 
relative risk ratio is simply a measure of the impact on the relative odds of one outcome being 
chosen relative to the baseline outcome, for a one-unit change in one of the right-hand side 
variables.5  We also can use the multinomial logit estimates to study the impact of specific 
independent variables on the probability that an average Latino voter would be Democratic, 
Republican, or Independent in their affiliation.  The multinomial logit model also gives us the 
opportunity to test for the joint explanatory power of the three explanatory models.6  We discuss 
multinomial logit results in the next section of this paper. 
 
Testing the Explanatory Models 
 We begin by examining the distribution of party identification in our Latino voter sample, 
as given in Table 1.  In the entire sample of Latino voters, we see that 56.5% of the Latino voters 
reported Democratic affiliation, while less than half of that amount reported Republican 
                                                                                                                              
where j is the number of choices, i denotes an individual, and n is the number of individuals in the sample.  
Estimation produces the relative probabilities that an individual would pick outcome 2 relative to 1, and outcome 3 
relative to 1, given their X values. 
5Recall from above that the probabilities for choosing outcomes 1 or 2 are: 
  Pr(y=1) = (1) / (1  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
 Pr(y=2) = (expXb(2)) / (1  + expXb(2) + expXb(3)) 
Thus, the relative probability of choosing outcome 2 relative to the baseline category (1) is: 
 Pr(y=2)/Pr(y=1) = expXb(2) 
This ratio is the relative risk.  The relative risk ratio for a one unit change in one of the right hand side variables can 
easily be written from these expressions as the exponentiated value of the respective coefficient: expb(2). 
 
6 This stems from a simple but important fact about maximum likelihood estimation of multinomial logit models.  If 
we begin by estimation of the log-likelihood of a fully-specified model (that is, a model with all of the right-hand 
side variables included) we obtain the value of the log-likeli ood function at convergence.  We can re-specify the 
model to include only a subset of the right- and side variables, which we call the constrained model; estimation of 
the constrained model yields a second log-likelih od value at convergence.  The ratio of these two log-lik lihoods 
has a convenient statistical distribution that lets us test for whether they are statistically distinct – in other words,
does the addition of the variables not in the constrained model add to the explanatory power of the fully specified 
model?  For details of the likelihood ratio test, see Greene (2000), pages 152-153. 
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affiliation (24.5%).  Among Latino voters in 2000, 13.2% reported that they were Independents, 
while 5.7% said they were affiliated with no political party (4.6%) or some other third party 
(1.1%).  In Table 1 we also provide the partisan distribution of the most recent American 
National Election Study in 1998 for comparison; in 1998, 51% of ANES respondents stated 
Democratic identification, 37% Republican identification, and 13% either Independent or 
apolitical.  Thus, Latino voters in the 2000 election were somewhat more Democratic in 
identification than the most recent ANES sample (being about 7% more Democratic), but much 
less Republican (being about 8% less Republican in identification). 
[Table 1 Goes Here] 
 In Table 2 we provide the breakdown of Latino voter identification by national origin, for 
Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Central Americans and compare it to findings for 
registered voters from the LNPS.  We find that Latino partisanship has not changed dramatically 
over the last decade.  Mexican-origi  partisanship has remained remarkably stable, with about 
67% of respondents reporting Democratic affiliation and about 13% Republican affiliation in 
both surveys.  Cuban origin Latino voers, n the other hand, have become somewhat more 
Republican, with moving from 66.7% in the LNPS to almost 70% of Cuban voters in this sample 
stating Republican identification.  Puerto Ricans have also become slightly less Democratic, 
moving from 69.3% in the LNPS to 64.4% of the respondents in this sample.  Central 
Americans, which were not part of the LNPS, are strongly Democratic in this sample with 57% 
of Central Americans stating Democratic identification.  While the LNPS and 2000 Voter Survey 
are not exactly comparable in terms of their sampling methods and question wording, the 
comparison of findings from the two surveys suggests that, as has been found in 
macropartisanship studies generally, Latino partisanship within national origin groups has been 
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fairly stable over the last decade (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith, 1996; Green and Palmquist, 
1990; Miller, 1991). 
[Table 2 Goes Here] 
 In Table 3 we provide a different analysis of the partisanship data from the 2000 Latino 
voter poll, giving the partisan figures for voters who were either native or foreign born.  Native-
born Latino voters (who make up about 52% of the sample) were strongly Democratic in 
identification, with 60% saying they were Democratic.  Only about 19% of the native born 
Latino voters are Republican, with 15% being independent. 
[Table 3 Goes Here] 
 In contrast, among foreign born Latino voters in 2000 (who make up 48% of the sample), 
there was a lower rate of Democratic partisanship, as 52% stated they had Democratic 
affiliations.  The foreign born Latino electorate is more Republican, with 31% Republican 
identification.  The foreign born are also slightly less independent or non-partisan than the native 
born. 
 Now we turn to our model, which we use to test the impact of each of the independent 
variables, controlling for all other possible impacts, and we present these results in Table 4. 
[Table 4 goes here] 
 Beginning with the results in Table 4 for the independence versus Democratic 
identification choice, we see first that two of the national origin variables are statistically 
significant: Mexican and Puerto Rican-or gin Latino voters are less likely to be independent than 
Democratic.  On the political side, school vouchers opponents, liberals, and not newly mobilized 
Latino voters are all more likely to be Democratic than independent.  Consistent with the 
findings of other studies of Latino partisanship, none of the economic model variables are 
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significant in the fully-specified model (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner, 1991; Uhlaner and García, 
2001; Nicholson and Segura, 2001).  
 Next, in the Republican versus Democratic identification results, we see both national 
origin and education effects continue to be statistically significant:  Cubans are more likely to be 
Republican than Democratic, while Mexicans are more likely to be Democratic than Republican, 
controlling for all other social, economic and political factors.  This is similar to Uhlaner and 
García’s (2001) findings from the LNPS, and suggests that national origin has an important and 
independent effect on Latino party identification.  Regarding education, we see that Latino voters 
at the lower rungs of the educational attainment ladder are more likely to be Democratic than 
Republican, all things constant.   
 However many of the political variables are significant in the fully specified model.  Of 
the issues, abortion, affirmative action, school vouchers, and government funded health 
insurance all have statistically significant effects; each is negatively signed, meaning that Latino 
voters with more liberal opinions are more likely to be Democratic than Republican.  We also 
see significant results for ideological beliefs, with liberals more likely to be Democratic but with 
conservatives more likely to be Republican.   
 Of the economic variables in our model, we find that economic perceptions do have a 
statistically significant impact on the choice between Democratic or Republican partisanship.  
More positive economic perceptions lead Latino voters to assume Democratic affiliations, while 
more negative perceptions lead them to Republican identities.  It is difficult to determine the 
direction of causality here.  Given this survey was done at the end of the Clinton administration, 
this could simply be a reflection of positive economic perceptions being related to positive 
feelings about the Democratic Clinton administration, and vice versa. 
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 As far as the ranking of the relative magnitudes of different independent variables in the 
Latino partisanship model, we find that in the first equation (independent versus Democratic 
identification) the strongest predictive variable is that for the new voters, followed by the 
national origin and issue opinion variables.  In the second equation (Republican versus 
Democratic identification), we find that by far he strongest predictive variable is Cuban origin.  
The second strongest significant predictive factor is conservative ideologies, followed by the 
other significant effects in this model. 
Since the partisanship literature suggests social, political and economic factors may each 
have an independent effect on party identification, we also ran three different models – on  with 
just the social variables, one with the political and one with the economic – and test the 
restriction that each set of variables (social, political, or economic) have no impact of 
partisanship.  We present the results of these chi-squar  tests in Table 5. 
[Table 5 goes here] 
 The basic conclusion that is clear from Table 5 is that the social and political models of 
Latino voter partisan hip have strong predictive power.  Both have strong and roughly similar 
chi-square values (173.83 for the social model and 162.25 for the political model), and the p-
value for each test is 0.00 which is highly significant controlling for degrees of freedom (the 
number of parameters in each test restricted to 0).  However, the chi-square value for the 
economic model is not strong (6.99) and is significant only at the p=0.14 level, which is greater 
than the conventional levels of statistical significance.  Thus, we conclude the Latino voter 
partisanship can best be explained by social and political factors, not by economic factors. 
 But, this analysis does not shed much light on the “real world” political questions we 
discussed at the beginning of this article.  If social and political factors are most important to 
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Latino partisanship, what social and political factors would have to change before we would 
begin to see wholesale “conversion” of Latinos from one political party to another?  In order to 
address this question, we ran probability estimates in order to see what effect changes in 
particular economic and political characteristics could be expected to have on Latino 
partisanship.  Table 6 provides a summary of these probability estimates. 
[Table 6 goes here] 
 The “typical” or “hypothetical” Latino voter here is either of Cuban (first three columns 
of estimates) or of Mexican (fourth through sixth columns of estimates) national origin, is 
unmarried, has a high school education, is in the 18-30 ag range, is male and Catholic, speaks 
only English at home, has status quo opinions on the issues (abortion, illegal immigration, 
affirmative action, school vouchers, government funded health insurance, and handgun control), 
does not believe that the budget surplus should be used for tax cuts, debt reduction, or increased 
social spending, identifies with a conservative ideology, is a newly mobilized voter, perceives his 
family’s economic circumstances as unchanged in the past year, and is of moderate income. 
 Given either typical or hypothetical Latino voter, computing these probability estimates is 
a matter of simply using the multinomial logit model estimates from the full specification and the 
independent variable values implied by the assumed typical or hypothetical voter.  Using this 
information, we compute the estimated probability that either the Cuban-origin or Mexican-
origin voter would identify with the Democratic or Republican parties, or as an independent –
this is the “baseline” probability estimate.  We then change one of the independent variables to 
another value, and recompute the probability estimates.  Thus, the difference between the 
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baseline and the recomputed probability estimate gives the estimated impact of such a change in 
the independent variable for the typical or hypothetical voter7. 
 Similar to what we found in our general model of Latino partisanship, these probability 
estimates suggest that income does not have a significant effect on Latino partisanship. For 
example, a movement from low inc me to high income for the hypothetical Mexican leads to a 
one percent decrease in likelihood of Republican identification and a one percent increas i  
likelihood of Democratic identification – exactly the opposite of what would be expected.  
Changes in income have almost no effect on Cuban partisanship either, with low income and 
high income Cubans having the almost the same probability of identifying with the Democratic 
and Republican parties.  This indicates that increases in Latino incomes should have little effect 
on Latino party identification. 
An issue that has been expected to move Latinos towards the Republican Party is 
attitudes towards abortion.  This does not seem to be the case when looking at Mexican 
partisanship.  A Mexican voter who decides they want to restrict abortion only becomes 3% less 
likely to be Democratic and 2% less likely to be Republican.  Changes in attitudes towards 
abortion do have some effect on Cuban partisanship, with those for restriction becoming 8% 
more likely to identify as Republican and those for expansion becoming 7% more likely to 
identify as Democrat.  Given that socially conservative Mexicans are generally understood to be 
the group most likely to move to the Republican Party because of their attitudes towards 
abortion, these findings suggest it is unlikely that will happen in the near future.
                                         
7 Technically, we simply substitute the estimated coefficients and fixed values into the probability expressions 
presented above in note 3.  This substitution allows us to produce an estimate of each probability f r the assumed 
voter type.  Changing one of the fixed values of the independent variables, and recomputing the estimated 
probabilities, gives us an estimate for the impact of that independent variable, given the values of the other 
independent variables.  This has been called the “first difference”methodology (King 1988). 
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The one political issue that does seem to have an important effect on Latino partisanship 
is attitudes towards expansion or restriction of government health insurance.  Mexicans who 
want to restrict government health insurance are more than twice as likely to identify as 
Republican and 12% less likely to identify as Democrats.  Cubans, on the other hand, are 19% 
more likely to identify Democratic if they favor expansion of government health insurance and 
are 12% more likely to identify Republican if they are against it.  This variable could be a 
reflection of respondents’ larger ideological attitudes about the role of government in society.  
Government health insurance is an important social safety net, and the fact that changes in 
attitudes about it have such a strong impact on party identification could mean that baseline 
Latino partisanship is predicated on particular philosophical attitudes towards the role and 
purpose of government.  It could be that the “baseline” Mexican and Cuban identify with 
Democrats and Republicans, respectively, because they agree with those parties’ philosophies 
about the role of government in society.  So, changes in those basic attitudes, as measured by this 
variable, result in greater changes in party identification. 
In any case, this analysis of the probability effects provide us with a sense of how stable 
Latino party identification should be, in the face of economic and political changes in the 
community.  While it seems unlikely that changes in income or attitudes towards abortion will 
significantly change which parties the different Latino national-origin groups identify with, it is 
possible that changes in ideological positions regarding th role of government in providing 
social services could result in significant changes in Latino party identification. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Both the traditionalists and revisionists agree that the acquisition of partisanship is above 
all a socialization process – potential voters must learn what the parties stand for and whether or 
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not the party’s beliefs coincide with their own.  Some traditionalists argue this process may occur 
in childhood in response to parental cues and remain relatively stable throughout a person’s 
lifetime.  Niemi and Jennings (1991) argue that while issue preferences do matter, parental 
influence remains important throughout a person’s lifetime.  What is not clear is what happens in 
cases, like that in the Latino community, where the parents are noncitizen and/or apolitical.  In 
Latino families, the children often become socialized into politics first and then socialize their 
parents.  Does that change the nature of the socialization process? 
Our findings provide some insights into the nature of that socialization process.  Newer 
voters and younger Latinos seem to lean toward independence, while older Latinos have more 
established partisan attachments.  This could be the result of the lack of availability of parental 
socialization in much of the community.  While we do not have specific generational information 
for the new voters in this sample, the findings do suggest that Latino partisanship evolves over 
time in the U.S.  As Latino voters become more socialized into the political syst m, they tend to 
move away from independence and towards the dominant party for their group – Democ ats for
Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans and Republicans for Cuban Americans (Uhlaner and 
García, 2001).  The fact that this partisan identification is based on policy issue preferences 
suggests that, unless the parties fundamentally change their issue positions, these Latinos’ 
identifications with those parties should remain fairly stable. 
Yet, this raises the question of why national origin should matter so much in this model, 
especially being of Cuban origin.  In this case national origin may be acting as a proxy for each 
group’s political integration process. Cuban Americans have had an historically-u ique 
migration and settlement experience.  They have been incorporated into American politics within 
particular political, institutional, and ideological constraints that have moved them strongly 
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towards identification with the Republican Party (Moreno, 1997).  Mexican Americans and 
Puerto Ricans, on the other hand, have had particular historical experiences that have moved 
them towards the Democratic Party.  This political experience could be what Latinos “learn” 
over time in the U.S. and could be replacing parental socialization as a way to transmit 
partisanship across generations.  Of course, once the parent in socialized into a particular 
identification, it is reasonable to assume the intergenerational transmission of that attachment 
will then function much as it does in other communities, making Latino partisanship less variable 
over time and across generations. 
One of the questions raised at the beginning of this article was the relative malleability of 
Latino party identification.  Current party appeals to the Latino community reflect a general 
feeling that this group is “in play” politically.  Given that over 40% of the Latino community is 
currently foreign born, and continued migration makes it likely that that proportion will remain 
fairly constant for the foreseeable future, our findings suggest that ther  will continue to be a 
large group of Latinos leaning toward independence or waiting to attach themselves to a political 
party.  Yet, this is not to say that these Latinos are the equivalent of a political tabula rasa – our 
findings indicate that their eventual attachments will be influenced by their policy preferences 
and the historical political experiences of their national-o igin groups. 
Both the traditionalists and revisionists in the partisanship debate agree that there is a 
window of time within which party identification can change and that it tends to crystallize with 
age – they disagree about the size and timing of the window.  It could be that the particular 
nature of the Latino community in terms of nativity means that immigrant and younge  Latinos 
have a larger window than the native born.  Or, it could be that the Latino community’s unique 
generational make-up allows us to see process that already occurred among Anglos and white 
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ethnic immigrants.  At the very least, comparative longitudinal studies of Anglo and Latino 
partisanship would be especially useful in tracking the origin and evolution of party 
identification, not only among Latinos, but in U.S. politics more generally. 
Thus, we conclude that Latinos are an important group to use in the study of political 
beliefs and attitudes.  Latinos, as a group, have had different experiences with the American 
social and political world, which do lead to different dynamics in their acquisition of 
partisanship.  Furthermore, there is considerable heterogeneity within the Latino community, 
across groups of different national origins and across generations.  Considerable research 
remains to be done to track how Latinos learn about the American political world, and how this 





 Latino Voter Sample 1998 ANES 
Democratic 56.6 (1499) 51 
Republican 24.5 (649) 37 
Independent 13.2 (349) 11 
Neither 4.6 (122) 2 
Other 1.1 (30) --- 
 
 
 Table 2 (Column Percentages) 
 Latino Voter Survey LNPS 
 Democrat Republican Independent N Democrat Republican Independent N 
Mexicans 67 12.6 13.3 1020 67.4 13 13.5 549 
Cubans 16.2 69.9 10.7 365 21.3 66.7 11 251 
Puerto 
Ricans 
64.4 19.5 9.0 446 69.3 15.8 6.8 348 
Central 
Americans 
57.1 18.8 16.1 149 -- -- -- -- 
N 1423 626 327 2524 710 305 133 1148 
 
 
Table 3    (Column Percentages) 
 Native Born Foreign Born N 
Democrat 60.4 52.3 1484 
Republican 18.8 30.7 645 
Independent 14.8 11.5 347 
Neither 4.4 4.9 122 
Other 1.6 06 30 




Table 4:  Latino PID Model 
 PR (Ind) v. PR (Dem) PR (Rep) v. PR (Dem) 
 MNL RRR MNL RRR 
Foreign-Born -.19 .82 .22 1.24 
 .21 .18 .21 .26 
Cuban .63 1.87 2.48* 11.84* 
 .35 .65 .28 3.26 
Mexican -.45* .64* -.43* .65* 
 .21 .13 .22 .14 
PA -.22* .80* -.06 .94 
 .09 .07 .09 .08 
Married -.18 .83 .25 1.29 
 .20 .17 .20 .25 
Some HS -.39 .68 -.89* .41* 
 .35 .23 .31 .13 
High School -.22 .80 -.52* .60* 
 .27 .21 .26 .15 
2-Year College -.10 .91 -.29 .75 
 .27 .25 .27 .20 
4-Year College -.06 .94 -.06 .94 
 .28 .26 .27 .25 
18-30 .15 1.17 .48 1.62 
 .33 .39 .33 .53 
30-45 .14 1.15 .17 1.18 
 .27 .32 .25 .30 
45-60 .11 1.12 -.11 .90 
 .28 .31 .25 .23 
Women -.29 .75 -.09 .91 
 .18 .14 .17 .16 
Catholic -.01 .99 -.04 .96 
 .12 .19 .18 .18 
Spanish -.46 .63 -.13 .88 
 .26 .17 .24 .21 
Spanish-
English -.12 .03 -.22 .80 




Table 4:  Complete Model of PID (Cont’d.) 
 PR (Ind) v. PR (Dem) PR (Rep) v. PR (Dem) 
 MNL RRR MNL RRR 
Abortion -.11 .89 -.36* .70* 
 .12 .11 .12 .09 
Illegal 
Immigration -.02 .98 -.09 .91 
 .12 .12 .12 .11 
Affirmative 
Action -.26 .77* -.25* .79* 
 .10 .07 .09 -.07 
School 
Vouchers -.53* .59* -.69* .50* 
 .18 .11 .18 .09 
Gov’t Health 
Insurance -.31 .73 -1.13* .32* 
 .30 .22 .26 .08 
Gun Control .10 1.10 -.15 .86 
 .10 .11 .08 .07 
Budget – 
Tax Cuts .50 1.64 .45 1.57 
 .35 .57 .31 .49 
Budget –
Debt Reduction .43 1.53 -.10 .91 




-.18 .84 -.32 .72 
 .21 .18 .20 .14 
Liberal -.66* .52* -.49* .61* 
 .21 .11 .24 .14 
Conservative -.27 .76 .88* 2.40* 
 .21 .16 .20 .47 
New Voter .66* 1.82* .10 1.10 
 .25 .46 .27 .30 
Economic 
Perceptions -.15 .86 -.19* .83* 
 .09 .08 .08 .07 
Income .00 1.00 -.02 .98 
 .07 .07 .07 .07 
Constant 1.19  2.70*  




Table 5:  Summary of MNL Results 
 Social Political Economic 
Chi-Square 173.83 162.25 6.99 
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.14 
Degrees of Freedom 32 24 4 
 
 
Table 6: Probability Effects for Typical Latino Voters 
Cuban Americans Mexican Americans 
 Democratic Independent Republican Democratic Independent Republican 
Baseline .33 .22 .45 .77 .17 .06 
       
Low Income .33 .22 .45 .77 .17 .06 
High Income .33 .21 .46 .78 .17 .05 
       
Men .33 .22 .45 .77 .17 .06 
Women .37 .18 .45 .81 .13 .05 
       
Restrict 
Abortion 
.27 .20 .53 .74 .18 .08 
Expand 
Abortion 
.40 .23 .37 .80 .16 .04 













Abramson, Paul R. and Charles W. Ostrom. 1991. “Macropartisanship: An Empirical 
Reassessment.” American Political Science Review 85:181- 92. 
 
Aldrich, John H. and Forrest D. Nelson.  1984. Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models.   
Newbury Park, CA:  Sage Publications. 
 
Alvarez, R. Michael. 1990. “The Puzzle of Party Identification.” Amer can Politics Quarterly  
18:476-91. 
 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. and Renée M. Smith. 1996. “The Dynamics of Aggregate  
Partisanship.” American Political Science Review 90:567-580. 
 
Brischetto, Robert. 1987. “Latinos and the 1984 Election Exit Polls: Some Findings and Some  
Methodological Lessons,” in Rodolfo de la Garza, ed., Ignor  Voices: Public Opinion 
Polls and the Latino Community.  Austin: CMAS Publications, University of Texas. 
 
Cain, Bruce E., D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole J. Uhlaner. 1991. “The Acquisition of  
Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans.” American Journal of Political Science 
35:390-422. 
 
Campell, Angus, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The 
American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
de la Garza, Rodolfo O., Louis DeSipio, F. Chris García, John A. García and Angelo Falcón.  
1992. Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Perspectives on American 
Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
DeSipio, Louis. 1996. Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos s a New Electorate.  
Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. 
 
Fiorina, Morris. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. N w Haven: Yale  
University Press. 
 
Franklin, Charles H. 1984. “Issue Preferences, Socialization and the Evolution of Party  
Identification.” American Journal of Political Science 28:459-478. 
 
Franklin, Charles H. and John E. Jackson. 1983. “The Dynamics of Party Identification.”  
American Political Science Review 77:957-973. 
 
García, F. Chris and Rodolfo O. de la Garza. 1977. The Chicano Political Experience: Three  
Perspectives. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press. 
 
García, F. Chris, Angelo Falcón and Rodolfo de la Garza. 1996. “Introduction: Ethnicity and  
 26
Politics: Evidence from the Latino National Political Survey.” Hispanic Journal of 
Behavioral Sciences 18:91-103. 
 
García, John A. 1997. “Political Participation: Resources and Involvement among Latinos in the  
American Political System,” pp. 7-15 in F. Chris García, ed., Pursuing Power: Latinos 
and the Political System. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
García Bedolla, Lisa. 1999. “Fluid Borders: Latino Identity, Community and Politics in Los  
Angeles.” Ph.D. Diss. New Haven: Yale University. 
 
Green, Donald Philip. 1988. “On the Dimensionality of Pub c Sentiment Toward Partisan and  
Ideological Groups.” American Journal of Political Science 32:758- 0.   
 
Green, Donald Philip and Bradley Palmquist. 1990. “Of Artifacts and Partisan Instability.”  
American Journal of Political Science 34:872-902. 
 
Greene, William H. 2000.  Econometric Analysis, fourth edition.  Upper Saddle River, NJ:   
 Prentice-Hall. 
 
Hero, Rodney. 1992. Latinos and the U.S. Political System: Two-Tiered Pluralism. Philadelphia:  
Temple University Press. 
 
King, Gary. 1998. Unifying Political Methodology.  Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press. 
 
Kosmin, Barry A. and Ariela Keysar. 1995. “Party Political Preferences of US Hispanics: the  
Varying Impact of Religion, Social Class and Demographic Factors.” Ethni  and Racial 
Studies 18:336-347. 
 
MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1992. “Macropartisanship.”  
American Political Science Review 83:1125-1142. 
 
Markus, Gregory B. and Philip E. Converse. 1979. “A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model  
of Electoral Choice.” American Political Science Review 73:1055-1070. 
 
Mattei, Franco and Richard G. Niemi. 1991. “Unrealized Partisans, Realized Independents, and  
the Intergenerational Transmission of Partisan Identification.” Journ l f Poltics 53:161-
174. 
 
Miller, Warren E. 1991. “Party Identification, Realignment and Party Voting: Back to the  
Basics.” American Political Science Review 85:557-568. 
 
Miller, Warren E. and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. The New American Voter. Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press. 
 
Moreno, Dario. 1997. “The Cuban Model: Political Empowerment in Miami,” pp. 208-226 in F.  
 27
Chris García, ed., Pursuing Power: Latinos and the U.S. Political System. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Nicholson, Stephen P. and Gary M. Segura. 2001. “Agenda Chang and t e Politics of Latino  
Partisan Identification.” Paper presented at the Minority Representation: Institutions, 
Behavior and Identity Conference, Claremont Graduate University. 
 
Niemi, Richard G. and M. Kent Jennings. 1991. “Issues and Inheritance in t  Format on of  
Party Identification.” American Journal of Political Science 35:970-988. 
 
Sears, David O. and Carolyn L. Funk. 1999. “Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults’  
Political Predispositions.” Journal of Politics 61:1-28. 
 
Uhlaner, Carole J. and F. Chris García. 2001. “Learning Which Party Fits: Experience, Ethnic  
Identity, and the Demographic Foundations of Latino Party Identification.” Paper 
presented at the Minority Representation: Institutions, Behavior and Identity Conference, 
Claremont Graduate University. 
 
Uhlaner, Carole J., Mark M. Gray and F. Chris García. 2000. “Ideology, Issues and Partisanship  
among Latinos.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science 
Association, San José, California. 
 
Welch, Susan and Lee Sigelman. 1993. “The Politics of Hispanic Americans: Insights from  
National Surveys, 1980-1988.” Social Science Quarterly 74:76-94. 
 
